It was a little after 4 p.m. Chicago time in the second week of October when the puck dropped on the 2025-26 season, with the Hawks on the road against what was then the two-time defending Cup champions in the Florida Panthers.
Visiting teams announce their starters first, and new head coach Jeff Blashill played it safe. Rather than putting superstar Connor Bedard out for the opening draw — as I’m sure the TV networks were hoping — he went with his shutdown line. He started Jason Dickinson, centering Ilya Mikheyev and Colton Dach, supported on the back end by Connor Murphy and Ethan Del Mastro, with Spencer Knight in net.
The Panthers had already been decimated by injuries by that time. Superstars like Barkov and Tkachuk were already out injured, so their top line that night was Conn Smythe winner Sam Bennett centering Brad Marchand and Carter Verhaeghe, supported on the back end by Niko Mikkola and old friend Seth Jones, with Sergei Bobrovsky in net.
Despite the favorable matchup of having Dickinson’s shutdown line matched up against the Panthers top line on the opening draw, the matchups wouldn’t stay that way. By the end of the night, Sam Bennett spent more 5-on-5 ice time against against Connor Bedard than any other Blackhawk, not one of the shutdown defenseman — who would have played more minutes — and also not Jason Dickinson, who was expected to be centering the shutdown line facing other team’s top talent. It was Bedard and his linemates.
As I reviewed the data from last season by looking through game-by-game logs, this became a recurring theme. I kept expecting to find that Dickinson’s line had the top defensive assignment and, while that was sometimes true, it was true a lot less often than I was expecting. I wasn’t expecting to find Connor Bedard’s line getting that assignment, especially at home, but I found that to be the case far more than I anticipated.
This data surprised me quite a bit. It tells a complicated story, and potentially a concerning one. After Dickinson’s departure at the trade deadline (and new contract with the Oilers), the Hawks need to figure out how to deploy their centers to make up for his absence. They must decide whether to solve that problem internally or with help from outside, which leads to a very interesting set of decisions the Blackhawks will have to make this offseason.
After his first season on the Chicago bench, I wanted to know how Jeff Blashill defended the top lines of opponents this season, so I went back through game-by-game listings and looked up the forward lines for each game, tried to figure out which opposing line was his top defensive priority, and then looked to see which Hawks line spent the most time on ice facing the opponent’s most dangerous forwards. I figured out which center had the top defensive assignment for each game, and then I looked at the that line’s fancy stats and W-L-OTL records in those games.
Looking through the game log of which line Blashill used against top opponents tells an interesting story over time. Some of the decisions were driven by injury, others by choice. It seems clear that Blashill wanted to mix up that assignment pretty regularly, as it was more common to see it vary game to game. When the top defensive assignment was consistent over several consecutive games, it was often because one or more injuries limited the options. For example, when both Bedard and Nazar were out injured for weeks at the same time, Dickinson got the assignment most nights — as you’d expect.
The Blackhawks were a relatively healthy team this season but, when they did have injuries, it was often to one of their top three centers.
Dickinson was injured a lot in the first two months of the season, dressing for only eight of the team’s first 21 games, limiting Blashill’s ability to use Dickinson’s line exclusively as a shutdown line — if that was his hope. During that period, the top defensive assignment mostly went to Bedard’s line, but lines centered by Nazar or Greene were also used.
Nazar was injured by a cross-check to the midsection against Calgary in early November, just 15 games into the season. He came back after missing only two games, but he wasn’t the same. In December, he took a puck to the face and missed about a month, an absence that overlapped quite a bit with the injury Bedard sustained against the Blues on Dec. 12 while taking a faceoff in the game’s final seconds. He’d miss the rest of December, returning in early January to limited action at wing for the rest of January. He wouldn’t return to center until after the Olympic break in late February.
For a 10-game stretch in the fall, all three centers were healthy and the top defensive assignment rotated, with none of the centers taking on the responsibility two games in a row. Then Bedard was injured in mid-December and Nazar took a puck to the face a week later, meaning that it was Dickinson’s line in the shutdown role for most of December and January since there weren’t a lot of other options, and Dickinson was the best performer in that role.
Dickinson was traded to Edmonton on March 4, and the Hawks had to adapt without him. They tried moving Donato to center for a game with moderate success, but that was a lot to ask of him in an unfamiliar role. They gave Nazar a few games and, once Frondell arrived, he got a few games as well. But in the mostly post-Dickinson played during March and April, it was Bedard’s line picking up the slack.
There were 28 games this season when Bedard, Nazar and Dickinson all dressed. The top defensive assignments went to Dickinson’s line in 12 of those games, Bedard’s line in nine, Nazar’s line in four and then lines centered by Oliver Moore, Ryan Greene and Nick Foligno once each. Blashill used Dickinson more than the others, but it was far from an exclusive role for him.
There were times when injuries dictated use, but Blashill sent out the Bedard line on the top defensive assignment often enough to know that in many of those cases it was intentional.
How clear is this data?
Unfortunately, it’s not as clear as we would like.
It’s not always a data limitation, but more of a measurement limitation when trying to measure chaos.
Sometimes the data is crystal clear. For example, right before Thanksgiving, the Hawks fell to the Avalanche 1-0. The line of Nathan MacKinnon, Artturi Lehkonen and Martin Necas was up against the Bedard line all night. That was clearly done on purpose by Blashill, who had the benefit of the last change with that game played in Chicago. The line of Bedard, Bertuzzi and Greene had a 52 percent shot attempt share and a 74 percent expected goal share during 11:52 of 5-on-5 ice time: an impressive performance in a surprisingly close game against top competition.
On other nights, though, the data was a lot less clear. In games when the Hawks went with 11 forwards and seven defensemen, every shift involved new linemates — so that got messy. Any time there was an early injury, or when either coach put their lines in a line blender, the data isn’t very clear. Also, some nights the opposing coach chased different matchups, so the matchups aren’t clearly aligned.
Last, this was a subjective exercise. For each game I tried to guess which opposing line was the Hawks top defensive priority. It’s always possible the Blackhawks may have had different priorities.
I would strongly suggest to only focus on differences in the data that are significant enough to show clear trends. Fortunately, this dataset does suggest some clear trends.
Unfortunately, they also tell a challenging and complicated story.
The table below shows the fancy stats of the lines given the top defensive assignment each night, along with their W-L-OTL record. In effort to better match up the stats of the lines that went head-to-head, instead of looking at just the centerman’s stats (i.e. Dickinson) this totals the stats of the line that faced the top opposition (i.e. the combined line of Dickinson, Mikheyev and Donato).
Here’s the table with those results:

While I caution against reading this data too closely, as it is a bit fuzzy and the sample sizes in some of these cases are small, the differences in some of these performances are distinct enough to draw clear conclusions.
In the games when the Dickinson line had the top defensive assignment, he and his line performed best in this role — but he’s now playing with Edmonton. Dickinson took on the top assignment more often than anyone other than Bedard, and his line exceeded 50 percent shares in shot attempts, shots on goal, goals scored, expected goals, scoring chances and high-danger scoring chances — a commendable season-long performance for Dickinson’s lines in those roles.
Conversely, Bedard’s line did not succeed in this capacity, performing substantially worse than Dickinson, even though it got the top defensive assignment roughly as often. Given Bedard’s subpar linemates and low performance metrics, he wasn’t really put in a position to succeed. It seems more likely they were using this experience to develop his capabilities in this role. Bedard’s metrics reside in the 30s and 40s for each category. Despite that, the Hawks still managed to win 11 of these games when Bedard’s line was given the top defensive assignment and spent much of it in their own end.
Meanwhile, in somewhat limited action — just nine games — Nazar’s line taking on the top defensive assignment has shown a lot of promise. He’s got fancy stats comparable to Dickinson while facing top opponents. The data is too limited to draw any firm conclusions, but what it suggests makes similar assignments in the future something worth seeing.
There were just nine games left in the season when Blashill first moved Frondell to center. As an 18-year-old, in context, he definitely passed the eye test doing so. He wasn’t always used against the opposing team’s top forwards in those games, so the data we have on him in that role is also too small to draw conclusions, but this limited early data is somewhat promising.
While the Hawks were dealing with injuries they pressed a few other centers into service too, but none of them have especially encouraging data. Greene got the most looks, but this was mostly last fall when he was even less experienced. Donato and Moore also got some limited action, but none of those three were miracle workers in this role, as most were given the role moreso as injury triage than as part of some master plan, and the numbers for them are about what you’d expect.
The cold hard facts are two-fold: 1) the center who performed best in this role (Dickinson) is no longer here, and 2) the line most often asked to meet these responsibilities last season (Bedard’s) was one of its poorest performing options, relative to other top choices.
Given those obvious facts, why was Bedard asked to perform that role so often?
What do you do if your no-doubt best forward is an elite scoring center who is also responsible defensively, but defense is not his top strength? You’d like to get him out there any chance you can, especially if he gives the coach that look that says he’s ready.
Should you put him out there against the MacKinnon line, or the Kaprizov line, or the Celebrini line? Or are you better off sending Dickinson’s line out for those matchups and trying to get him out there with fewer defensive responsibilities?
This isn’t the dilemma currently facing the Blackhawks, it’s the one currently facing the Oilers (forgive the references to the now-former coach in the article quotes below).
It’s clearly a luxury, having a superstar like McDavid to send over the boards every night. But that luxury comes with a cost. For instance: Knoblauch coaches a team that just acquired shutdown centre Jason Dickinson, yet against Tampa, Knoblauch deployed McDavid’s line against Tampa’s top unit. McDavid’s line got caved in, and one might wonder why you even acquired Dickinson if not to relieve McDavid of some defensive pressure?
That question sounds relevant, and familiar.
Well, it’s not that simple in Edmonton. Here, coaches don’t simply pull McDavid off the ice when the opponent’s best player hops over the boards. Todd McLellan never did it, nor did Dave Tippett, Jay Woodcroft or even Ken Hitchcock during his short stint. But this season, while fellow Art Ross running mates Nikita Kucherov and Nathan MacKinnon have even-strength goal differentials of plus-66 and plus-48, respectively, McDavid’s number is plus-11.
The Oilers went to the Stanley Cup final in each of the last two seasons and they find themselves asking the same question the rebuilding Blackhawks have: when do I send out my best player vs. when do I save him in favor of my defensive specialist?
On February 24, 2015, Chicago had a mayoral election. That same night in a game against the Florida Panthers, Patrick Kane injured his collarbone. While the latter seemed like it wouldn’t be much more than a brief local story, it grew in importance over the years.
The timing of that Kane injury was oddly very beneficial for the 2015 Blackhawks. It happened right before the trade deadline, allowing the Hawks to put Kane on LTIR and get cap relief. His recovery was perfectly timed for his return right around the start of the playoffs, when the salary cap was no longer relevant. With that cap relief, the Hawks trade-deadline additions included Antoine Vermette, a player they couldn’t have afforded if Kane’s cap hit was still in place for the rest of the regular season.
In subsequent years, a number of teams were in a position to do something similar, notably Tampa and Vegas, and this eventually led to the new provisions in the CBA that implemented a salary cap for the playoffs, functionally disbanding the practice.
But thinking back to when the Hawks were able to add Vermette in 2015, this gave them a talented third line of Vermette centering goal-scoring winger Patrick Sharp, and skilled rookie Teuvo Teravainen. Most teams have a top six and a bottom six but, in 2015 the Blackhawks had a top nine.
A top nine sounds awesome, it would be much better to have nine dangerous scoring forwards than just six of them, right? Of course it would, that’s a no-brainer. So why doesn’t every team do that?
There are a number of reasons, but the biggest one is the salary cap. A team with nine skilled forwards should probably cost more than the salary cap will allow, and the example we’re discussing only worked because that team circumvented the cap. It’s a major impediment.
But when you look at the rebuilding Blackhawks and all of the cheap talent they have in the pipeline, it’s clear that they’re going to be able to afford a top nine, at least in the earlier years of the rebuild. Most of the highly skilled young players on the Blackhawks are either on their entry-level contract or second NHL deal. There isn’t a lot of expensive talent on this roster yet, and that will only change gradually. Next season, new deals for Bedard (TBD) and Nazar ($6.6M) will kick in but, despite those expensive additions, the main salary cap concern for the Blackhawks isn’t staying below the cap ceiling: it’s reaching the cap floor. In a rising salary cap era, they’ve had to use the dead money contracts of Shea Weber ($7.85M) and Ryan Ellis ($6.25M) just to hit the cap floor. Right now, the bottom of the cap is more of a concern for them than the top.
They have prospects that project as top-six forward in Connor Bedard, Anton Frondell, Frank Nazar, Roman Kantserov and Nick Lardis. They have another tier of first-round picks who project as middle-six, including Oliver Moore, Marek Vanacker, Sacha Boisvert, Vaclav Nestrasil and Mason West. And they currently have a number of vets in their middle-six like Tyler Bertuzzi, Teuvo Teravainen, Ryan Donato and Andre Burakovsky. That’s potentially 14 forwards competing for the top six roster spots — quite the traffic jam.
Some interesting questions become relevant:
– How should the rebuilding Blackhawks look to construct their bottom six?
– Given the abundant and affordable skill in the pipeline, should they look to build a top nine?
– Is a line of defensive specialists necessary in this environment, and if so where does it fit?
– If you go with a top nine, how does one of those lines absorb the defensive responsibilities typically assigned to a bottom-six line?
It’s tempting to look at any two performers in a dataset and say they should have used the high performing one more and the low performing one less, it’s a Captain Obvious take.
But how does that standard apply to developing players on a rebuilding team? You have to play them to get better, you have to put them in situations that challenge them so they can learn how to meet those challenges. You want to do that without giving them more than they can handle, but that challenge is a key component of growth.
How do you balance that?
That question must have been front-of-mind for Jeff Blashill this season as he put his lineup together. After the fact, the obvious question is why put Bedard in that position so many nights, facing the other team’s top players and spending many shifts stuck in his own end, instead of facing less dangerous opposition and spending more time in the offensive end?
During training camp, this is what Blashill said about developing the young players on this team:
“The reality is our growth will be based on how quickly our young guys mature,” Blashill recently told the Sun-Times. “[Not only] how they mature physically, but more importantly, how their games mature. “[We’ll] go from a young, talented group to a group that plays winning hockey. The most exciting opportunity we have as a coaching staff is to mold our players into winning players as quickly as possible.”
He didn’t come right out and say he was planning to throw some of these guys to the wolves, but that’s what he did. He gave the Bedard line the MacKinnon assignment in all three games against the Avs, including the two at home, where he had control of those decisions.
He didn’t say that he was going to have Frondell move to center, a position he hadn’t played all season, and in just his third game at center he’d send him out against the McDavid line all night.
But that’s what he did.
In an effort to develop these young centers, Blashill has shown some bravery and a high pain threshold. He found a balance between asking the vets to take the responsibility some nights, but also asking the young players to shoulder heavy weight too. When healthy, they alternated and rotated those responsibilities, less so when injuries dictated lineup decisions.
Shocking as it was when I first saw the data, upon closer inspection, his decision was a defensible one — at least in context. The Blackhawks weren’t going to win the Stanley Cup this season, and there probably wasn’t a plausible pathway to the playoffs either. Developing the young players made far more sense than depriving them of experience, to chart an easier course.
When it comes to forwards in the offensive zone, we’ve been asking the Blackhawks to play their young talent in top-six roles. Fans were excited to see, and at times even begging for players like Moore, Lardis and Frondell to take bigger roles in the Hawks top six.
It makes sense to make the same asks of the young Hawks forwards in the defensive zone. I can’t be critical of Blashill giving young forwards key responsibilities in the defensive zone in the same way we’ve been asking for him to give opportunities to young top-six forwards in the offensive zone. For a developmental season, a roughly even balance between a vet like Dickinson or the young forwards taking the top defensive assignment seems like a reasonable split.
We have mostly focused on the forwards but, obviously, the defensemen matter, too. As the young defensive corps improves and gains experience, they should be an asset in all three zones. In the defensive end, you would expect them to shut down plays quicker in the future, as well as make cleaner breakout passes. In the offensive end, they’ll be able to keep pucks alive longer and, in the neutral zone, they’ll be able to close down breakouts resulting in transition opportunities the other way.
There has been a lot of focus on the defensive performance of the forward group and what it needs to do to get better, but some of that improvement will happen organically as the defensemen improve as well.
In 2011-12 the Los Angeles Kings won the Stanley Cup and had the second most hits in the league that season. The following season, the Hawks won the Stanley Cup even though they finished dead last in hits that season. The season after that, it was the Kings back on top, and once again they were a top hitting team, finishing with the second most hits in the 2013-14 season. And they were followed once again by a championship Blackhawks season in 2014-15 when Chicago had the second fewest hits in the league.
There’s more than one way to win a Stanley Cup. A lot of different strategies can work, as long as you have the best personnel for that strategy, and the team is functioning together as one unit.
From Blashill’s recent interview in The Athletic:
“I’m a huge believer there’s a lot of different ways to play hockey,” Blashill said. “I know that because different teams win a lot in different ways. So, there isn’t like a style that has to fit your personality, your team.
Chicagoans are used to the familiar. We may not know what it’s like to have a Hall-of-Fame quarterback, but Bears fans expect that level of play out of our middle linebackers. And Blackhawks fans have been spoiled with defensive centers and effective shutdown lines. We’ve seen guys like Dave Bolland, John Madden and Marcus Kruger win Cups in this town that way, and we’ve seen other talented defensive centers like Pius Suter, Phillip Danault and Jason Dickinson fill the role competently.
For Chicagoans paying attention to recent comments by Jeff Blashill in early April on his philosophy for roster construction, it raised some eyebrows among those who noticed his comments were silent on the familiar:
“I think ultimately the best teams in the league have kind of three really hard matchup lines,” Blashill said before Tuesday’s 4-3 overtime loss to the Winnipeg Jets. “By that, I mean lines that are hard to match. You go into a game, the really good teams all have three, the good teams have two. … Ultimately, we’re going to need three really good lines here if we want to become a really good team, have a fourth line that has good roles, whether it be penalty killers, physicality, toughness, whatever that might be.”
When the subject came up again in June, Blashill didn’t talk about using a shutdown line then, either.
“Ultimately, in this league, you need to have four lines that can — it doesn’t mean they’re all going to get equal ice time, I’m not saying that — but you need probably three scoring threat lines to be a great team and a line that can go out and give you momentum as a fourth line. And you see that with both the Stanley Cup finalists right now. They both have three lines that can score and a fourth one that they trust and gives you momentum. We’ve got to figure out the chemistry.”
Rebuilds are not fun, they’re a godawful slog that are hard to endure. When Blashill talks about three skilled lines, a genuine top nine that other teams struggle to match up against, that sounds exciting as hell, especially for a fanbase that’s been through some unwatchable lean years.
But he’s oddly silent on the need for a shutdown line.
This is unfamiliar, can it work?
This season Connor Bedard set career highs in goals, assists and points, despite missing 13 games due to injury and spending a month post-injury at wing. He did that while facing opposing teams’ top lines on a surprising number of those nights.
Given the heavier responsibilities, his individual defensive metrics declined. This season, he was conceding a higher expected goals rate against per 60 minutes than either of his first two seasons, along with a higher rate of high danger chances allowed per 60 minutes. It’s a concern.

The concerns were two-fold: 1) he and his future linemates have a lot of growth ahead of them, but as they do, are their defensive ceilings high enough to repeatedly take on this responsibility? And 2) for a team near the bottom in goals scored, are you getting enough offense out of your offensive superstar this way?
Another way to look at it is that it’s borderline unfair.
The Hawks rebuild prioritized defensemen before forwards, as defensemen have a longer development timeline. They took Bedard early in their rebuild, he was too good to pass up, but he hasn’t had a lot of top-six level help these last three seasons. His two most common linemates this season were Burakovsky and Greene who finished with 33 and 29 points, respectively, on the top scoring line for the Blackhawks, despite their center being better than a point-per-game player, finishing with 75 points in 69 games.
That’s a really heavy offensive burden to put on the shoulders of the superstar. It’s an awful lot to combine that with giving his line the top defensive assignment on more nights than any other center.
The Hawks scored the second fewest goals of any team in the league this season. They lost 14 games in an overtime or shootout, with another eight losses in regulation by a one-goal margin, plus a few more where they were only down by one before giving up an empty-net goal against. That’s a lot of games in which one more goal could have resulted in one or two more standings points.
One more goal by the Bedard line in some of those games, if he had fewer defensive responsibilities and greater offensive opportunities, starts to look really enticing. Necessary, even.
Bedard’s season has seemed almost intentionally difficult, intentionally challenging. There was a lot of talk at the beginning of the season about how Blashill was going to bring the most out of Bedard. He didn’t coddle him, he challenged him. The performance, at least defensively, isn’t where it needs to be yet. But Bedard didn’t wilt, wasn’t shy about taking on guys a lot bigger than him, and generally seemed to be enjoying the season, at least more so than previous seasons. He and his linemates have to improve, but they seem eager for the challenge.
In the middle of January, the Blackhawks had a home game against Winnipeg. Bedard was still in limited action, he wasn’t allowed to take faceoffs and was functionally playing wing.
It was Dickinson’s line with Mikheyev and Donato that spent the night up against the Jets top line of Mark Scheifele, Alex Iafallo and Kyle Connor.
That night, Bedard’s line was busy with another assignment: they were matched up against the line of Jonathan Toews, who received a three-minute standing ovation from the crowd in his first game at the United Center as an opponent.
No Blackhawk had more TOI against Toews than Bedard, not even any of the Hawks defensemen. The Blackhawks won 2-0 on goals from Jason Dickinson and Connor Bedard, and Spencer Knight got the shutout.
Fans were treated to both the legacy and future Blackhawks; it was a spectacular night in Chicago.
Not every championship team has this type of player, but there’s a type of player that’s clearly a winning prototype, he keeps popping up among the best.
Barkov, Bergeron, Kopitar, Toews.
Selke-caliber No. 1 centers tend to enjoy Stanley Cup parades.
Those four No. 1 centers have won eight of the last 17 Stanley Cups, including a stretch of six in a row from 2010-2015. If you’re trying to build a roster that can win a Stanley Cup, that seems like a key piece.
This is a question that the Blackhawks are currently asking about Anton Frondell. In his draft year, every national analyst compared him to Aleksander Barkov, while every local analyst compared him to Jonathan Toews.
But life has a way of getting in the way sometimes, because Frondell then spent most of this season playing wing, first for his SHL club Djurgarden, and then also for Sweden at World Juniors. He wasn’t really getting PK time on either team.
For all of the excitement about getting the next Barkov or the next Toews, his major and junior teams in Sweden were using him more like he was Patrick Kane. It was a little deflating, but understandable.
So, it was a pleasant surprise when Jeff Blashill decided to throw all of that out the window. After just three games on Bedard’s wing, they moved him to center in his fourth ever NHL game, a position he hadn’t played really at all this season.
Here’s what Blashill had to say about his thought process:
“As I said to Anton, he hasn’t played center all year, so it’s probably not the easiest position to put him in — I recognize that,” Blashill said. “But he’s played center a lot in his life, and I think he’s got traits to be a really good 200-foot winning center. And I’d like to get a look at it this year rather than at the beginning of next year, so that if that’s the way we go, we can hit the ground running with whatever might be. It’s going to put a lot on his shoulders, and it might affect his game a little bit until he gets real comfortable, but I want to look at it anyways.”
After his first game at center facing the Devils, Blashill had positive reviews:
“I thought he did good,” Blashill said. “He’s not even a week into his NHL career, playing center against some really good players at times. I thought he looked good. He’s really strong on the puck, wins a ton of those, stops on pucks. He’s got a lot of winning habits. He did a good job.”
In his first game at center, Frondell did not get the top defensive assignment against the Devils’ top line — that responsibility went to Bedard’s line.
But Blashill soon tested him as well because, in his second NHL game at center, Frondell, Bertuzzi and Mikheyev spent the night facing the Jets top line of Scheifele, Connor and Iafallo. Frondell’s line had a 65 percent shot attempt share and a 79 percent expected goal share.
He was clearly stress-testing Frondell’s line as, in the next game, it got the Connor McDavid line. They didn’t do quite as well as they had the game before, but they still fought the McDavid line to a 44 percent shot attempt share and 49 percent expected goal share.
That was just his sixth ever NHL game, and just his third game at center. And the opponent was Connor McDavid.
After that Bedard line took the top defensive assignment for a few games, but Frondell’s line got it for the final three games of the season, facing the Blues’ Robert Thomas line, then the Sabres’ Tage Thompson line, and last followed by the Sharks’ Celebrini line. His line didn’t do as well in those games, although neither did the team. Mixed results in limited action, overall.

His numbers tanked in his final few games, as they did for the team, and in his small sample size that was enough to send his season-total fancy stats south, despite the fact that his topline production was very impressive (3 G, 6 A in 12 games).
It’s very early, and the sample size is still very small, but there’s a lot to like about what Anton Frondell brings to this team. It’s more than just the scoring numbers and his potential at center is very promising.
The Blackhawks were hoping to see a guy who could play center and command 200 feet. It’s way too early to make that prediction of Frondell, but nothing he’s shown so far suggests that he can’t. By June, Kyle Davidson said “we’re working toward making his primary position center” and Blashill said the same.
One of the ways the Blackhawks have sheltered Bedard as he’s grown into his role in his early seasons is that, even when he’s playing center, he doesn’t always have to assume the defensive responsibilities of the center in his own defensive zone — sometimes one of his wingers will pick up that responsibility.
It’s a bit more complicated than this, but a simple way to think about it is that the first forward back takes on the defensive responsibilities of the center in the defensive zone. Once everyone is back, they can switch if they want. That’s something you see all of the time in all defensive systems. For example, the right and left defenseman will switch sides, and then rotate back, as play dictates.
Blashill said the same in his recent interview in The Athletic:
“The way that we play, there’s a lot of interchangeable pieces between centers and wings, so it’s probably not as big a deal either way as maybe it’s made out to be at times.” […] “They’re both gonna spend time down low in D-zone coverage. They’re both gonna spend time in the middle of the ice.”
Forwards already do this on the forecheck and when defending the breakout. Instead of re-aligning themselves into assigned positions for C, LW and RW, they have assignments for F1, F2 and F3, and the closest forwards to those positions adopt those roles. This is the same philosophy being applied to the defensive zone.
When the Hawks wanted to shelter Bedard, they could put him with defensively responsible wingers and they could relieve his defensive burden, since those wingers could take the center’s defensive zone responsibilities. At the end of the 2024-25 season, Bedard finished with linemates of Ryan Donato, who scored 31 goals that season, and Ilya Mikheyev, a speedy winger who is defensively responsible and led the team in shorthanded goals. This season, they moved Donato and Mikheyev down to Dickinson’s shutdown third line, as those were his most common wingers. Whether playing with Bedard last season, or Dickinson this season, they can be trusted defensively, and they were used to spell the center when needed in the defensive zone.
This season Bedard was far less sheltered. Subtracting some time due to injury, Bedard ended up playing 53 games at center. In 46 of those games, he had at least one rookie on his wing. Most often, it was Ryan Greene, but Dach, Moore, Frondell and Lardis also made appearances. He only played seven games at center all season without at least one rookie on his wing.
Conversely, in Dickinson’s 46 games playing center for the Blackhawks this season, in only eight of those games did he have a rookie on his wing. Most often, his linemates were some combination of Mikheyev, Donato or Bertuzzi, three defensively responsible veterans better capable of winning the possession battle and flipping the ice, even against top opponents.
Meanwhile, Bedard’s linemates for the bulk of the season were Ryan Greene and Andre Burakovsky. The three of them are among the five worst Blackhawks at conceding expected goals against per 60 minutes, while guys like Dickinson, Donato and Mikheyev were mid-pack, despite facing similarly dangerous opponents. It’s hard to tell if Greene and Burakovsky are poor at defense, or were just overwhelmed by the assignment, but they suffered for it. Greene is a rookie who shows a lot of promise and is expected to improve defensively, so it might simply be that the undermanned Blackhawks were doing what they could with what they had.
As a defensive specialist, Dickinson is far better as a defensive center that Bedard is, but he also benefitted from more defensively responsible wingers. Given those caveats, how do you come up with responsible takeaways from all of this?
It seems clear that Bedard isn’t at his defensive ceiling yet, either personally or as part of a line. His linemates were neither offensively dangerous enough to keep his line in the offensive zone against top opponents as much as they needed to be, nor were they defensively responsible enough to get them out of the defensive zone against dangerous competition. The Hawks’ No. 1 line is still not at the standard it needs to reach.
The goal isn’t to turn Connor Bedard into a defensive center. Every defensive center in the league would gladly trade places with Connor Bedard, and every GM would gladly trade their defensive specialist for Bedard straight up. But they’ve got to figure out how to get him spending more time in the offensive zone. Do they need to give him wingers that can better get him out of the defensive zone, or wingers that can help keep him in the offensive zone? Ideally both, but it remains a work in progress.
Frank Nazar didn’t have a Jekyll-and-Hyde season so much as a Jekyll, Hyde, Jekyll season.
He started out the season strong, then suffered through a long stretch after getting injured, before finding his game again after the Olympic break.
In early November, he took a cross check to the midsection, perhaps a hip or thigh, and it affected him. He only missed two games due to that injury but, when he came back, he wasn’t the same player for a very long time. It was plainly obvious, as skating is his strongest attribute and it you could tell he was affected: he just wasn’t the same player.
Compounding matters, he took a puck to the face in December and then missed another month on top of that. Between those two injuries he really wasn’t the same player again until after the Olympic break.
He played 15 games at the beginning of this season up until the Calgary game where he was injured in the midsection, and at that time he had 11 points in 15 games (a 60-point pace over 82 games). In the final 25 games after the Olympic break, he had 17 points (a 56-point pace). But in the 27 games he played in that middle period, after his first injury in early November until after the Olympic break in late February, he only had 13 points (a 39-point pace) and looked nothing like the player he had previously.
Injuries happen and NHL players have to recover and power through them, something that Nazar dealt with in his first full season in the NHL.
It also makes it harder to evaluate how well he performed in the role.
In limited action, in a small sample size, he did quite well going up against other teams top lines, somewhat comparable to Dickinson. He has 50+% rates for corsi for, shots, goals, expected goals, scoring chances and high danger scoring chances when facing other teams’ top line.

In limited action, he performed well enough to wonder why he didn’t get more opportunities. Part of the reason was likely his substandard play while recovering from injury. But even in the post-trade deadline period, when all of their centers were healthy and Dickinson had been traded away, Nazar only got the top defensive assignment in two games in March and April: a matchup against Vancouver when he had the Pettersson line, and a matchup against the Predators when he had the O’Reilly and Stamkos line.
Nazar is an attractive option defensively at center for the same reason Moore is: both have the speed and quickness to close down opponents early. In playoff hockey, where time and space make all of the difference, they can take away both if they work hard enough to get the job done.
The better question with Nazar is where does he fit? He has the skillset to be an attractive option in a number of different roles.
Maybe he’s one of the Hawks three key centers, as he is currently. After Frondell arrived, Blashill went with Bedard, Nazar and Frondell as his top three centers and spread his limited offense around three lines, somewhat diluting it, but giving Blashill his stated goal of three difficult lines to matchup against.
If that’s the case, then two of those three lines will have to be very responsible defensively come playoff time. Frondell’s line could plausibly be one of those two. They’re trying to develop Bedard into that role, but it’s a work in progress. Given Nazar’s promising but limited dataset, I’d like to see his line stress-tested more frequently in this defensive capacity. We’d like to know what we’d have in a Nazar line and that answer still feels incomplete.
But there’s a reasonable case to be made to move Nazar to wing, particularly Bedard’s wing. Nazar can pretty consistently skate past his opponents, something he does while playing center, coming from deeper in his own zone where he has more defenders to work through and pass. Yet he’s still able to do it pretty consistently, god bless youth.
If you move him to wing, he’d be starting much higher in the defensive zone, much closer to the blue line where the opposing defenders already are. The immediate pressure he could put on those defenders could cause them a lot of problems. He’d be much more dangerous to get past them while defending up higher in the zone as a wing than he does as a center. And even when he isn’t blowing past them, the threat that he might do so could get opposing defensemen to retreat instead of defending the blue line, making zone exits easier for both he and his teammates.
Additionally, he can take draws when needed and rotate with Bedard to take over center responsibilities in the defensive zone when necessary. A recurring question throughout this analysis is what linemates can you give Bedard to get him and keep him in the offensive zone more, and regardless of whether you’re talking about someone who can help Bedard in the offensive zone or the defensive zone, it’s hard to come up with better options than Nazar or Frondell. If at least one of those two has to center another line, then it probably makes sense to consider Nazar on Bedard’s wing. He’s not the only option, but he’s a really attractive one.
Nazar is still an open question, but a very interesting one. In limited data, he shows a versatility that could be used in a number of different strategies. If the Hawks don’t utilize a shutdown line and instead have Bedard, Frondell and Nazar anchoring a top nine, he’ll have to drive play and be effective at 200 feet. If the Hawks bring in a shutdown center and make one of their top three lines a shutdown line, they can consolidate their top-six-level skill into fewer lines and Nazar can be the linemate for Bedard that adds to his line’s effectiveness in all three zones.
How they choose to use Nazar going forward will be very telling.
Next season, the Blackhawks are going to have a deeper and more skilled roster than they’ve had this season. That’s not a guarantee they’ll have a better record, though.
In order to be a better team, rather than just be a better collection of players, they’ll need to improve in all three zones.
It’s not yet clear how they’re going to construct their roster for next season, or how they plan to defend opponents’ most dangerous players.
They do have some clear options though for how they can defend with their forwards:
1) They can continue on the path they’ve been on in March and April, build out three scoring lines, headed up by some order of Bedard, Frondell and Nazar, each expected to be defensively responsible and at least two of them expected to win the possession and goal battle against other teams’ top talent.
2) Ask one of their existing centers to fill the role left by Jason Dickinson’s absence on the shutdown line. That could be one of their scoring centers (Bedard/Frondell/Nazar) being asked to sacrifice offense to prioritize defense in a clearly defined shutdown role. Or that might be asking one of their other young center prospects (Moore/Greene/Boisvert) to focus their development on growing into that shutdown center role.
3) Bring in an outside defensive center, either through free agency or trade, to fill the shutdown center role, allowing either Frondell or Nazar to move to wing, preferably on Bedard’s line.
In recent years, the Blackhawks organization has generally been good about not tipping their hand publicly on any subject before they have to. It’s frustrating as a fan, but understandable. Right now, the Hawks are publicly acting like Option No. 1 is their plan, as Davidson suggested a few weeks ago. But it’s also the only option currently available, so you have to take that with a grain of salt.
It’s not clear which approach they’re going to choose. Also, despite the growth from the players, this is still a team just coming out of its rebuild and not yet fully realized. They may have to implement an interim plan before they implement their long-term plan.
The rebuild has been a long, unpleasant slog. Each time the Hawks hit a losing streak, fan complaints grow louder and more voluminous. Fans understand wins and losses in a way that isn’t always as relatable to them with stats under the hood. Rightly or wrongly, the vibes of the rebuild need some wins, too — not just development.
If the Hawks want to improve their win-loss record next season, rather than just being a better collection of hockey players, this defending question is going to be a key piece, as it will more closely correlate to their position in the standings than a lot of other issues that will get more attention this summer.
In plenty of games this season the Hawks were within a goal of the lead, in either direction, headed into the third period. They often needed a third goal but, on too many of those nights, it wasn’t there to be had. With the addition of Frondell, Kantserov and Lardis next season, there’s a highly plausible path to the offensive improvements needed to get that extra goal.
But after the loss of their shutdown center, if this team declines defensively, those goals may not be enough. In Dickinson’s absence, they’ll either need to figure out how to defend better, or how to outscore their problems.
I’m eager to see their plan for doing that. It should be an interesting offseason.